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Robert Shimer, University of Chicago and NBER
This is an ambitious paper. It documents a novel set of facts about the na-
ture of labor market expansions during the last 15–20 years in the United
States,anditdevelopsasignificantextensionto theBurdettandMortensen
(1998) model to explain them. I am not going to quibble with the facts.
Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay are correctly cautious in noting that most of
their data cover only two recessions, in 1991 and 2001. Both events were
mild by historical standards, and the comovement of labor market vari-
ables, for example, unemployment and hours, and other economic out-
comes, notably labor productivity, was unusual by historical standards.
Unfortunately,thereislittletodoaboutthisexceptwaituntiltheeconomy
generates more data and possibly look for data from other countries.
I instead focus this discussion on the authors’ theoretical explanation
for these facts. I start by explaining the mechanics of their model, the
forces driving the firm size distribution and the amount of job‐to‐job
transitions. The main point of this part of my discussion is that one
can understand the mechanics without studying firm optimization,
which hopefully clarifies how the model works. I then turn to wage de-
termination. While Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay assume that firms have
the ability to fully commit to a path of wages, they also implicitly as-
sume that following an aggregate shock, firms can reoptimize. Since the
solution to the firm’s problem is time inconsistent, I discuss whether
reoptimization, rather than the shock, drives the transitional dynamics
of wages in the model. Finally, I offer an alternative model of wage de-
termination that both avoids this time inconsistency issue and improves
the model’s performance along other dimensions.
I. Mechanics
The mechanics of the model are based on a simple and natural set of
assumptions. First, at time t ∈ ½0;∞Þ, unemployed workers find firms
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workers find firms at rate λ1;t. Second, all workers agree on a ranking
of the firms. More precisely, a typical firm is named x ∈ ½0;1 ; without
loss of generality, firm names are uniformly distributed. An employed
worker switches from firm x to a newly found firm x′ whenever x′ > x
and not otherwise.
1 Third, worker‐firm relationships end exogenously
according to a Poisson process with constant arrival rate δ. This set of
assumptions delivers a rich theory of unemployment, the firm size dis-
tribution, and job‐to‐job transitions.
Start with unemployment. According to these assumptions, the frac-
tion of workers who are unemployed evolves according to
u
:
t ¼ δð1   utÞ λ0;tut: ð1Þ
The unemployment rate increases when an employed worker, a fraction
1   ut of the population, loses her job, at rate δ. It falls when an unem-
ployed worker finds a job, at rate λ0;t. This is a standard formula in
search models, and its quantitative implications are well understood.
For example, suppose that λ0;t changes from λ0 to λ′ 0 at t ¼ 0. If λ0;t
had been constant long enough before t ¼ 0 for the unemployment rate
to reach its conditional steady state, u0 ¼ δ=ðδ þ λ0Þ, the subsequent
evolution of the unemployment rate satisfies
ut ¼ e ðδþλ′ 0Þt δ
δ þ λ0
þ½ 1   e ðδþλ′ 0Þt 
δ
δ þ λ′ 0
: ð2Þ
Since the unemployment rate is a first‐order autocorrelated random
variable, it is straightforward to compute the time it takes it to converge
halfway to its conditional steady state, log2=ðδ þ λ′ 0Þ periods. With stan-
dard parameterizations, the transitional dynamics end trivially fast. For
example, in their paper Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay set δ ¼ 0:025 and
λ′ 0 ¼ 0:40 (compared with λ0 ¼ 0:37), all expressed in monthly units.
Then the shock reduces the unemployment rate from 6.3% to 5.9%
and the halftime of convergence is approximately 1.6 months.
Now turn to the firm size distribution. Let LtðxÞ denote the number of
workers employed in a firm of rank less than x at t. This evolves as
L
:
tðxÞ¼xλ0;tut  ½ δ þð 1   xÞλ1;t LtðxÞ: ð3Þ
It increases when an unemployed worker finds a job in a firm with rank
less than x, at rate xλ0;t. It decreases when a worker employed in such
a firm loses her job, at rate δ, or finds a job at a firm with rank above x,
at rate ð1   xÞλ1;t. It is again straightforward to solve this differential
equation. Suppose now that λ0;t changes from λ0 to λ′ 0 and λ1;t changes
Shimer 60fromλ1 to λ′ 1 att ¼ 0.Assuming that both parameters had been constant
long enough for the distribution of workers across firm sizes to reach a




ðδ þ λ0Þ½δ þ λ1ð1   xÞ 




e½δþλ′ 1ð1 xÞ ðt′ tÞut′dt′
 
; ð4Þ
it is straightforward to differentiate this equation to get back to equa-
tions (2) and (3). There is no longer an exact expression for the halftime
of convergence to steady state. However, noting that the unemployment
raterapidlyreachesitssteady‐statevalue,replaceut′ withtheconditional
steady state δ=ðδ þ λ′ 0Þ in equation (4). Then the halftime of convergence
to steady state for LtðxÞ is log2=½δ þð 1   xÞλ′ 1 . While this is reasonably
short when x ¼ 0, convergence dynamics are slow for x ¼ 1. In the cali-
brated model, λ′ 1 ¼ 0:12, and sothe halftime of convergence ranges from
4.8 to 27.7 months, depending on the firm’s rank. In summary, while the
transitional dynamicsof the unemployment rate isfastenough tobeeco-
nomically uninteresting, the transitional dynamics of the fraction of
workers in firms of different size classes is slow.
The objects that Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay plot in their figure 14
correspond to the densities ∂LtðxÞ=∂x, although I have omitted one im-
portant detail: I have assumed that workers are equally likely to contact
all firms, whereas in the paper workers are more likely to contact larger
firms. To bridge this gap, one has to reinterpret x as the fraction of lower‐
named firms, weighted by workers’ contact probability. In any case, the
results I obtain are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper.
While small (low‐x) firms grow immediately after the shock, they soon
shed workers to big (high‐x) firms, which grow continuously after the
shock. In the short run, employment shifts toward the small firms, but
in the long run the positive shock moves employment toward the large
firms, the main thesis in this paper.
While the model is qualitatively successful at explaining the firm (or
establishment) size distribution and its recent comovement with labor
market expansions, I am skeptical that the explanation is correct. Ac-
cording to the model, firm size is entirely determined by firms’ ability
to attract and retain workers. All firms in Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay’s
world would always prefer to have moreworkers at agiven wage, apre-
diction that is surely counterfactual. The authors suggest that their the-
ory may omit two important limitations on firm size: credit constraints
Comment 61and the availability of workers with the appropriate human capital.
While I agree that there may be a role for these factors in explaining firm
size and growth, this discussion seems to miss the most important deter-
minant of firm (and establishment) size: technology. Buera and Kaboski
(2008)findthattheaveragemanufacturingestablishmenthas47workers
and the average manufacturing firm has 57. The corresponding num-
bers for services are 14 and 18. Those authors argue that this reflects
the nature of the production technology and the need for service pro-
ducers to locate close to their customers, not simply an unwillingness to
payhighwages.Limitstospanofcontrol(Lucas1978)arealsopresumably
animportant determinant ofoptimal firmsize. But if these factors are also
important, how should we interpret the consistency between the model
and the recent behavior of the firm size distribution? Should the goal be
to match the behavior of the entire distribution or just a distribution con-
ditional on some narrowly defined firm characteristics that determine its
optimal size? Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay argue for the former, whereas
my sense is that the model is more appropriate for explaining conditional
size distributions.
Even if the model abstracts from significant pieces of the explanation
for the firm size distribution, individual workers’ job turnover dy-
namics are at least in part governed by their search for better opportu-
nities, measured by wages, job amenities, match quality, and so on. This
the model captures well. Although one worker may prefer firm j to j′
and another may prefer j′ to j, we can still let LtðxÞ denote the probabil-
ity that any worker is employed at a firm in the lowest xth percentile of
her own personal firm distribution. Following the posited shock, this
satisfies (4), and the rate at which a worker switches jobs conditional
on being employed is
Jt ¼
λ1;t
1   ut
Z 1
0









To understand the first equation, note that an employed worker finds a
new firm at rate λ1;t and accepts it with probability 1   x if her current
firm is at the xth percentile of her distribution, with density ∂LtðxÞ=∂x.
Dividing by the share of workers who are employed gives the rate at
which an average unemployed worker switches jobs. The second equa-
tion follows from the first using integration by parts.
Using equation (5), I find a path for the job‐to‐job transition rate that
is quantitatively identical to the one in Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay’s
figure 18. Thus this figure is substantially more general than the specific
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the impact of the shock, continues rising as unemployed workers take
bad jobs, but eventually falls back below its immediate postshock value
as workers move into better jobs. But although the authors do not stress
thispoint,theresultisaquantitativefailure.Lookatthescaleinfigure18.
The monthly job‐to‐job transition rate jumps up from 2.78% to 2.83%,
rises slightly, and then falls back to 2.81% in response to a fairly sizable
shock. Such movements are quantitatively trivial and would be unno-
ticeableintheirfigure10,whichshowstheempiricaljob‐to‐jobtransition
rate moving by an order of magnitude more.
Given the short time period covered by figure 18, one possible expla-
nation is that the model is correct and the data are anomalous. That is, Jt
is barely cyclical. That does not seem to be the case. I obtain a longer
measure of the job‐to‐job transition rate from the public use micro data
in the March supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS). Since
1976, the March supplement has asked workers how many employers
they had in the previous year. A coarse measure of the number of job‐to‐
jobtransitionsis
P∞
i¼1 niði   1Þ,whereni isthenumberofworkersreport-
ing i employers. I multiply this by 52 and divide by the total number of
weeks worked in the previous year to obtain the job‐to‐job transition
rate per full year of work. Of course, many workers have a spell of un-
employment in between employers, so this should be an upper bound
on the job‐to‐job transition rate. To obtain a lower bound, I look at only
people who reported working for 52 weeks. An intermediate estimate
follows Blanchard and Diamond (1990) and also examines a question
about the number of spells of job search. I assume that a worker who
reports i employers and j < i spells of job search had i   j   1j o b ‐to‐
job transitions during the previous year, and all other workers had zero
transitions. Figure 1 plots these three measures against the monthly job‐
to‐job transition rate. Over the common time period, the cyclical behav-
ior of the four series is similar, although the levels are significantly
different. Moreover, the annual measure shows a significant decline dur-
ing the recessions in 1982 and 1991, suggesting that the decline in 2001
was not an anomaly. I conclude that the model’s inability to generate
quantitatively significant movement in the job‐to‐job transition rate is a
failure.
II. Wages
The model does generate comparatively large movements in wages
(fig. 19 in the paper). To understand the behavior of wages, look back
Comment 63at the firm’s problem in equations (1)–(4) of the paper. At time 0, each
firmcommitstoatimepathofwageswt,commonforallitsworkers.That
path determines the value of a job at the firm Vt, and so it determines
whether a worker who is employed elsewhere moves to the firm when
she gets an offer from it and then whether she stays at the firm when she
gets an outside offer. That is, wages are used for both recruiting and re-
taining workers. Of course, the initial stock of workers has already been
recruited,andsopayingtheseworkershighwagesisusefulonlybecause
it helps to retain them.
Now consider what happens when the firm chooses a time path of
wages fwtg at time 0. The firm would like to leave the current stock
of workers indifferent about quitting for unemployment by setting
V0 ¼ U0, but then to have a much higher value of Vt at all positive t so
that it can recruit new workers and retain its existing workers when they
get outside offers. Formally, the firm would like the state variable Vt to
jump at date 0. If we ignore the lower bound on wages in equation (4),
thiscouldbeachievedbyalump‐sumpaymentfromthecurrentworkers
to the firm on that date.
Although Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay do not recognize it, a time 0
lump‐sum payment is implicitly part of the solution they provide. When
they write the Hamiltonian (9) and the necessary first‐order conditions
Fig. 1. The three solid lines show measures of the annual job‐to‐job transition rate
from the March CPS (left axis); see the text for details. The dashed line shows 12 times
the monthly job‐to‐job transition rate from the monthly CPS (right axis).
Shimer 64(10)–(14), they omit one necessary condition. Since the initial value of
the state variable V0ðpÞ is chosen freely, either the costate variable ν
associated with the worker’sv a l u eV is equal to zero initially or the
no‐quitting constraint V0ðpÞ ≥ U0 is binding: ν0ðpÞ½V0ðpÞ U0 ¼0. This
condition is violated in their proposed solution, and so the wage path
they characterize is not the solution to equations (1)–(4).
Instead, the authors’ analysis implicitly ignores the minimum wage
constraint (4) and relaxes the requirement that the value function be con-




trol VtðpÞ need not be continuous, with discontinuities representing
lump‐sum payments. One can show that the optimum indeed features
a lump‐sum transfer at time 0 so as to set V0ðpÞ¼U0, with time incon-
sistency causing no subsequent distortions. That is, if a firm were pre-
sented with an unexpected opportunity to reoptimize at some date
t > 0, it would charge its existing workers a lump‐sum fee so as to leave
them indifferent about becoming unemployed but would otherwise
leave the path of wages unchanged. Thus the (implicit) lump‐sum fee
takes care of the time inconsistency problem.
In the solution to the problem in equations (1)–(4), the minimum
wageconstraint(4)bindsforsomeinitialperiod,pushingdownworkers’
value V0ðpÞ.This distorts the contract offeredto new hires and sois more
costly than an initial lump‐sum transfer; however, the firm would still
always attempt to extract value from the initial stock of workers and
would try to extract more value if its initial labor force L0ðpÞ is larger.
But this is not the problem that Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay solve.
III. Constant Wage Model
It should be clear that the time inconsistency of wages is a subtle prob-
lem. To sidestep it, suppose we relax the assumption that each firm
must pay all its workers the same wage, but instead impose that firms
resolve the time inconsistency problem by committing to pay each
worker a constant wage, independent of the history of shocks. Now
the cross‐sectional distribution of wages is a state variable and cannot
jump following a shock.
To see how this affects the results, I focus on a case in which all firms
are identical, so each employed worker produces y units of output but
each unemployed worker produces nothing. All workers, employed or
Comment 65unemployed, contact a firm at an endogenous rate λt, and jobs end exog-
enously at an exogenous rate δ. The contact rate λt is determined by
firms’ job creation decision: at any point in time, a firm can pay a cost
k to contact a worker selected at random from the population. Without
knowing the worker’s employment status or wage, the firm offers her a
constant wage w. If the worker is unemployed, her reservation wage is
zero,
2 whereas if she is employed she accepts any job paying more than
her current wage. Finally, assume for algebraic simplicity that firms do
not discount future profits.
Let FtðwÞ denote the distribution of wage offers at time t and GtðwÞ
denote the fraction of workers who are paid less than w or who are un-
employed at t. The expected profit from offering a wage w at t is






t fδþλt′′½1 Ft′′ðwÞ gdt′′dt′   k: ð6Þ
The worker accepts the job with probability GtðwÞ, in which case she
generates profit y   w until she leaves. The probability that she is still
at the firm at some future date t′ is the probability that she has received
neither an exogenous separation shock nor a better job offer at any in-
tervening date t′′. Finally, offering the job costs k. In equilibrium,
πtðwÞ ≤ 0 for all w and t. Whenever λt > 0 and w is in the support of
Ftð Þ, πtðwÞ¼0, so firms are willing to offer the appropriate wage. In




tðwÞ¼δ½1   GtðwÞ    λt½1   FtðwÞ GtðwÞ: ð7Þ
It increases when a worker who is employed at a higher wage loses her
job and falls whenever an unemployed worker or a worker paid less
than w finds a job paying at least w.







t fδþλt′′½1 Ft′′ðwÞ gdt′′dt′:
Time‐differentiate this, eliminating G
:






  GtðwÞ: ð8Þ
Now since πtðwÞ¼HtðwÞðy   wÞ k, HtðwÞ ≤ k=ðy   wÞ in equilibrium
and the wage w is offered in equilibrium only if HtðwÞ¼k=ðy   wÞ.
Shimer 66Equivalently, the wage w is offered at t only if t is a local maximum of
Ht′ðwÞ. A necessary condition for this is that H
:
tðwÞ¼0. Then (8) implies
that w is offered in equilibrium only if HtðwÞ¼GtðwÞ
2=δ. Combining
these expressions for H gives a necessary condition for w to be offered





y   w
s
≡ G ðwÞ: ð9Þ
Thatis,λtF′ tðwÞ > 0onlyifGtðwÞ¼G ðwÞ.Moreover,onecanprovethatif
GtðwÞ > G ðwÞ, enoughfirmswillofferwtopushGtðwÞimmediatelyback
down to this value—otherwise πtðwÞ > 0—whereas if GtðwÞ <
G ðwÞ, no firm will offer w, λtF′ tðwÞ¼0. Together equations (7) and (9)
provide enough conditions to characterize an equilibrium for arbitrary
initial conditions.
To understand the implications of these equations, suppose that k ¼
0:1 and δ ¼ 0:025, and productivity falls from y ¼ 1t oy′ ¼ 0:98 at t ¼ 0.
Also assume that the economy had reached a steady state by t ¼ 0. The
comparative statics from this shock are fairly uninteresting. The steady‐
state wage distribution is G ðwÞ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
δk=ðy   wÞ
p
on ½0;y   δk , whereas




. The arrival rate of job offers falls from
λ ¼ 0:475 to λ′ ¼ 0:470, raising the unemployment rate from 5.00% to
5.01%. The mean wage falls from 0.90 to 0.88, in line with the decline in
productivity, and the job‐to‐job transition rate falls from 5.38% to 5.36%.
But this masks some interesting transitional dynamics. One can




y′   w
s
;1   e δt þ e δt
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
δk
y   w
s ()
: ð10Þ
That is, the wage distribution at t is the minimum of the new steady‐
state distribution with the lower productivity level y′ and the distribu-
tion obtained from the decay of the old steady‐state distribution as
workers lose jobs at rate δ. Following the adverse shock, there is a brief
period when no new jobs are created, ending at t ¼ 0:02; but then λt
jumps to its new steady‐state value λ′ ¼ 0:470. Subsequently, firms cre-
ate jobs only with wages w ∈ ½0;wðtÞ , where wðtÞ satisfies
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
δk
y′   wðtÞ
s
¼ 1   e δt þ e δt
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
δk
y   wðtÞ
s
;
Comment 67rising monotonically over time from 0 at t ¼ 0:02 to y′   kδ as t → ∞. The
wage offer distribution at t is
FtðwÞ¼1  
δ½1   GtðwÞ 
λ′GtðwÞ
on ½0;wðtÞ . Note that this implies that a mass of firms offer exactly
wðtÞ at t; however, this does not give rise to any mass points in the cross‐
sectional wage distribution G because the mass point rises continuously
over time.
The initial period with no job creation leads to an increase in the
unemployment rate, raising the cross‐sectional wage distribution G
uniformly. This has little effect on the incentive to create high‐wage
jobs since such jobs recruit workers mainly from other firms. How-
ever, it does raise the profitability of offering low‐wage jobs, and so
t h o s ea r et h ef i r s tt oa p p e a r .A sh i g h ‐wage workers gradually lose
their job as a result of exogenous shocks, higher wage offers become
more viable, pushing up w  ðtÞ. Figure 2 shows the decline in the aver-
age wage following this one‐time adverse shock.O v e rt h ec o u r s eo f
10 years, the wage declines by about 2%. The reduction is slow be-
cause, by assumption, workers in high‐wage jobs do not suffer a wage
cut following the shock. However, this is partially offset by firms’ de-
cision to offer only low‐wage jobs during the transition following the
shock.
Fig. 2. Change in average wage, constant wage model
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model, workers switch jobs whenever they find one paying a higher
wage, so the job‐to‐job transition rate is
Jt ¼
λt
1   ut
Z wðtÞ
0
½1   FtðwÞ dGtðwÞ:
It is again straightforward to compute this, and I show the results in fig-
ure 3. Following the adverse shock, the job‐to‐jobtransitionratefalls from
5.4%brieflytozeroasnojobsarecreated.Butalthoughthejob‐findingrate
λt recovers almost immediately, the job‐to‐job transition rate stays below
its new steady‐state value for years because the new jobs being created
generallypaylowerwagesthantheexistingjobs.ComparedwithMoscarini
andPostel‐Vinay’saveragejob‐to‐jobtransitionrateintheirfigure18,the
movements depicted here are enormous.
The response to a positive productivity shock is asymmetric. Imme-
diatelyfollowingtheshock,firmscreateapositivemeasureofhigh‐wage
jobs, above the old highest wage y   δk. This implies that a positive frac-
tionofworkersswitchemployersatthatinstant.Thejob‐to‐jobtransition
rate subsequently remains high as firms continue to create high‐wage
jobs. Eventually firms find it profitable to also create low‐wage jobs, in
the interval ½0;w  ðtÞ , where w  ðtÞ is increasing over time. In this case, the
economyreachesitsnewsteadystateinfinitetime.Inpractice,Ifindthat
the transitional dynamics are quick. Since λt ≫ δ, it takes much less time
to move workers into high‐wage jobs than to move them out.
Fig. 3. Job‐to‐job transition rate, constant wage model
Comment 69In my view, the constant wage model has some significant advan-
tages over the one in Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay’s article. First, it en-
dogenizes firms’ decision to create jobs rather than simply postulating a
joint shock to the productivity and the arrival rate of job offers. Second,
it delivers significantly larger fluctuations in the job‐to‐job transition
rate and slow movements in wages. However, Moscarini and Postel‐
Vinay’s model is richer along important dimensions. They allow the
job‐finding rate to differ for employed and unemployed workers and
allow firms to discount future income. Both those extensions to the con-
stant wage model should be feasible at the expense of algebraic com-
plexity. More important, Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay allow for firms
with heterogeneous productivity; that is tricky to do here because all
t h ej o b sw o u l dn a t u r a l l yb ec r e a t e db yt h em o s tp r o d u c t i v ef i r m s .A
technological theory of optimal firm size may again be useful for ex-
plaining why this does not happen.
IV. Conclusion
The facts outlined by Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay are intriguing.
Whether they are important business cycle facts or simply characteris-
tics of two tranquil decades in the United States awaits more data. Their
model provides a novel interpretation of those facts. This discussion
has tried to explain how the model works by extracting some pieces
of it, notably the mechanics of the firm size distribution and the job‐
to‐job transition rate and the time inconsistency of wages. Along the
way, I have argued that it may be possible to improve the model’s per-
formance along some important dimensions while making it theoreti-
cally more appealing. It should be clear that our understanding of
the role of job search in explaining the firm size distribution and the
extent of job‐to‐job transitions is still rudimentary and that the qualita-
tive and quantitative behavior of on‐the‐job search models depends on
some subtle assumptions.
Endnotes
1. While this is a primitive assumption here, in their paper Moscarini and Postel‐Vinay
focus on a rank‐preserving equilibrium in which more productive firms always offer
workers a higher value; so workers move whenever they contact a firm that is more pro-
ductive than their current employer.
2. There is no option value to unemployment since search while employed is as effi-
cient as search while unemployed in this model.
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